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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20170552-CA

TODD MULLINER,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) as an appeal from a court of record
in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Whether the district court erred when it ruled on Mulliner's motion to
correct an illegal sentence. "Whether a sentence is illegal 'presents a question of
~

law that [the appellate court will] review for correctness."' State v. Vaughn, 2011
UT App 411, ,Jg, (quoting State v. Dana, 2010 UT App 374, ,I3, 246 P.3d 756). This
issue was preserved in the district court by Mulliner's motion to correct an illegal
sentence and the arguments made in support. R.138; R.248-278.
CONTROLLING STATIITORY PROVISIONS

All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
Defendant, Todd Mulliner, appeals from the judgment, sentence, and
commitment on one count of Sale of Unregistered Security, a third degree felony,
and one count of Securities Fraud, a third degree felony. Specifically, Mulliner
appeals from the 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment order
issued by Judge Low on June 26, 2017, following Mulliner's motion to correct an
illegal sentence.

B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On November 18, 2003, Todd Mulliner was charged by information with two
counts of Sale of Unregistered Securities, third degree felonies under Utah Code
§61-1-7 and §91-1-21, two counts of Securities Fraud, third degree felonies under
Utah Code §61-1-1, and two counts of Sale of Security by Unlicensed Broker-Dealer,
third degree felonies under Utah Code §61-1-3. R.001-02. During the time of the
prosecution in this case, Mulliner was in the custody of the Utah Department of
Corrections and serving a prison sentence at the Utah State Prison on a case from
St. George. R.007; R.013; R.018, etc.
After waiving his preliminary hearing, Mulliner plead no contest to Counts
1

and 2, and the remaining counts were dismissed. R.018-19; R.020-29. The

written statement in advance of plea characterized the "plea bargain" as follows:
"Defendant agrees to pay $3,000 in Restitution." R.024. No other agreements or
sentencing recommendations are contained within the plea statement.

2
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On March 17, 2004, Mulliner was sentenced to serve "an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State prison" on each count. R.031. Judge
Schofield's order required one count to run concurrent and one count consecutive. 1
On April 17, 2013 the court filed a letter from Mulliner wherein he
complained that the court clerk "wrote up the sentence and commitment orders
incorrectly". R.037. It doesn't appear that the court did anything with this letter.
Two years later, on October 23, 2105, Mulliner filed his "Rule 22(e) Motion
to Correct an Illegal Sentence." R.040. Attached as an exhibit to the memorandum,
Mulliner provided a typed transcript of the sentencing hearing prepared by
Mulliner's brother. 2 The State responded and argued that the sentence was not
illegal because, although Judge Schofield was not explicit, the court meant to order
Count 1 and Count 2 would run concurrently, and therefore his concurrent
sentences on Counts 1 and 2 had already been served. R.057-58. Judge Laycock
held oral argument on February 3, 2016. R.074, R.103-26. The court acknowledged
that the sentence contained a clerical error and was illegal for failing to designate
whether Count 1 and 2 were concurrent or consecutive. R.122-23. The court issued
a corrected sentencing order. R.078-79.
Two days later, Mulliner filed a pro se "New Motion to Correct the New

The record of Judge Schofield's oral order was either unclear or contradictory on
this point for reasons explained below.
2
Judge Laycock "accept[ed] the transcript prepared by the defendant's brother."
R.075. See also R.121-22 ("with the State's acquiescence I'm going to take the
defendant's brother's transcript of the video tape at face value.").
1

~

3
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Illegal Sentence, Rule 22(e) and Rule 3o(b)". R.082-84. In this motion, Mulliner
explained that the corrected sentence was illegal because Count 1 and Count 2 were
ordered to run concurrently while Count 1 was to run concurrent to the St. George
case and Count 2 was to run consecutive to the St. George case. R.082. According
to Mulliner's motion, this would require the sentence on Count 2 to run twice.
R.082. On February 22, 2016, Judge Laycock denied the new motion because it
"contains no arguments that have not already been considered by the court."
R.087. Judge Laycock found that "(n]othing in the Utah statutes or case law
prohibits this court's interpretation of Judge Schofield's original order or this
court's correction of his flawed order." R.090. Judge Laycock characterized her
ruling as "a final order from which the defendant can file a notice of appeal within
the next 30 days." R.090.
On March

11,

2016, Mulliner filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. R.092. The

appeal was numbered by this Court as 20160190-CA but was summarily affirmed
without briefing because the Court characterized Mulliner's "New Motion" as a
motion to reconsider, which did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal from
Judge Laycock's February 3, 2016 ruling. R.098-99. Because Mulliner's notice of
appeal was filed within 30 days of Judge Laycock's second order, but not filed
within 30 days of the February 3 ruling, his appeal was dismissed as untimely.
On April 12, 2017, Mulliner, now represented by the Utah County Public
Defender Association, filed another Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, this
time to Judge Thomas Low, as Judge Laycock had retired. R.138-50. In that motion

4
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Ci)

Mulliner claimed that the sentence issued by Judge Laycock was illegal because it
@

was internally contradictory and that the sentence should be corrected to be legal
and consistent with Judge Schofield's original sentence. The State did not respond
to Mulliner's written motion and he filed a notice to submit along with a proposed
order (R.200, 202), but Judge Low set the case for oral argument on June 7, 2017.
Mulliner objected to the State presenting any arguments because it had not
responded to the motion. R.250. Judge Low denied the objection because he had
"to do the right thing" and wanted "as much help" and he could get. R.251.
On June 26, 2017, Judge Low granted Mulliner's motion insofar as he found
Judge Laycock's order was internally contradictory. However, Judge Low did not
adopt Mulliner's proposed solution, and instead issued the 2nd Corrected
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order requiring Count 2 to run consecutive to
Count 1, while Count 1 runs concurrent with the St. George case, and Count 2 runs
consecutive to the St. George case. R.217.
On July 12, 2017, Mulliner filed timely notice of appeal from Judge Law's
June 27, 2017 order. R.232.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Judge Schofield's initial sentencing order
After Mulliner no contest one count of third degree felony Sale of
Unregistered Security and one count of third degree felony Securities Fraud, his
case was referred to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence investigation
report. R.018-19. The court ordered "[a] short report to be prepared in regards to

5
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consecutive vs. concurrent." R.019. The presentence investigation report prepared
and filed by AP&P did not make any explicit recommendation "in regards to
consecutive vs. concurrent", and instead only recommended "the subject be
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison ... " R.296. At sentencing on March 14, 2004, Judge Schofield orally
pronounced Mulliner's sentence as follows:
In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree
felonies it will be the order of the Court that this defendant server (sic)
an indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State
Prison, an an (sic) order additionally you pay restitution in the sum of
$2975, that you not hold any positions of fiduciary responsibility. I am
going to order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other
time you are serving and that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will
have one concurrent and one consecutive sentence so that there is
some modicum of separate accountability. (Inaudible ... ) Board of
Pardon will figure out what to do with that (Inaudible ... ).
R.153-54.3 The written sentencing order did not accurately describe Judge

Schofield's oral sentence in that it transposed the language for Count
language for Count

2.

1

with the

"The sentence for count 1 is to run consecutive to the time

the defendant is now serving. Count

2

is to run concurrent with the time the

defendant is now serving." R.031.
Judge Laycock's corrected sentencing order

After receiving Mulliner's pro se motion to correct the illegal sentence,
wherein Mulliner claimed Judge Schofield's sentence was illegal because it failed

Note that Judge Schofield otherwise followed AP&P's recommendation exactly
by ordering $2975.00 in restitution and ordering Mulliner not hold any positions
of fiduciary responsibility. R.296.

'i1

6

®
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to address how Count 1 and Count 2 would relate to each other and it contained
@

clerical errors because the 2 counts had been switched, Judge Laycock agreed and
orally issued the following order:
So I have two counts here. One is a sale of unregistered security, a
third degree felony. I will order that -- and I'm giving you the benefit
under part (a), because Judge Schofield didn't address it, I think the
only fair thing at this point is to do is to assume that he meant
concurrent. I think to do otherwise is not fair to you. So I'm going to
make it concurrent. So I will order that those two zero to fives will run
concurrent with each other. That takes care of part (a).
Under part (b) I will do what I think was his intent. That Count I,
which is sale of unregistered security, will run concurrently with the
St. George case, and hang on, I want to put that exact number -- have
to find it ...
Okay, it will run concurrently with case No. 991500379. That's Count
I. County II will run consecutively to case No. 991500379. What I'm
going to do, I'm going to make this an amended sentencing.
R.124-25. The relevant portion of Judge Laycock's written amended sentencing
recorded these matters as follows:
Court orders the defendant serve no more than five years on each third
degree felony, concurrently with each other.
Count 1 will run concurrently with the St. George matter,
#991500379. Count 2 will run consecutively to case #991500379.
R.075.
Judge Low's 2nd corrected sentencing order
Following Mulliner's motion to correct Judge Laycock's sentence Judge Low
issued a written ruling and a 2nd amended sentencing order. In the ruling Judge
Low decided to "simply restore Defendant's original sentence" and vacate Judge
Laycock's amended sentence R.224, 228. Judge Low found Judge Schofield's

7
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original sentence was "not ambiguous" and that it "was clearly the court's intention
to require one of the counts in this case to run consecutively to Defendant's
previous sentence." R.225. Apparently, according to Judge Low, Judge Schofield's
lack of clarity was due to a "grammatical parallelism." R. 225. Judge Low found that
the only correction to Judge Schofield's initial sentence was necessary, that being
to order Count 1 and Count 2 to run consecutively, because, according to Judge
Low, "[t]here is simply no other way for count 1 to run concurrently with
Defendant's previous sentence and for count 2 to run consecutively to it." R.22728. Judge Low's ruling ordered as follows:
Defendant's sentence is corrected to require that he serve zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison on each of the two third-degree felonies
in this case, that Count 2 run consecutively to count 1, that count 1 run
concurrently with Defendant's sentence in case number 991500379,
and that count 2 run consecutively to Defendant's sentence in case
number 991500379.
R.229-30. Judge Low also issued a 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment order describing the amended sentence as:
The prison time on count two is to run consecutively to count one. The
prison time on count one is to run concurrently with the prison time
on case number 991500379. The prison time on count two is to run
consecutively to the prison time on case 991500379.
R.217.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court erred in attempting to correct Judge Laycock's illegal
sentence. Judge Low's 2nd Corrected Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order is
illegal because it is ambiguous, internally contradictory, and defies the meanings

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the words it purports to use. Count 1 and Count 2 can be neither consecutive nor
@

concurrent while Count 1 in concurrent to the St. George matter and Count 2 is
consecutive to the St. George matter. Judge Low's attempt to "restore" an illegal
sentence created yet another illegal sentence.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CORRECTING AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE

A. Rule 22(e) and Illegal Sentences
In April of 2017, when Mulliner filed his second Motion to Correct an Illegal
'@

Sentence, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that "[t]he
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time." UTAH R. CR. P. 22(e) (2016).4 An illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, has been interpreted as "one which is ambiguous
with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to
the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction
did not authorize." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,I13, 203 P.3d 984 (quoting United

States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Mulliner's claims of illegality have changed as the various versions of his
sentence have been issued. For example, initially, when he challenged Judge

The Utah Supreme Court later amended Rule 22 to limit the specific instances
when the court can correct a sentence and included a timing element to several
kinds of corrections. That amendment became effective May 1, 2017. See UTAH R.
CR. P. 22 (2017).
4

9
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Schofield's written order, Mulliner claimed the sentence must be corrected because
it failed to designate the relationship between Count 1 and Count 2, as required by
§76-3-401(1), and that it contained a clerical error by confusing what Judge

Schofield said about Count 1 with Count 2, and vice versa. See R.041-42; R.061-63.
After Judge Laycock issued her amended sentence, Mulliner's claims of illegality
then addressed the internal contradiction between having Count 1 and Count 2 run
concurrently, while having Count

1

run concurrent with the St. George case and

Count 2 run consecutive to the St. George case. See R.
Now that Judge Low has amended Judge Laycock's order, Mulliner claims
his sentence is illegal because it is again internally contradictory (in a new way) or
because it is ambiguous as to the time and manner in which it is to be served.
B. This sentence is both ambiguous and internally contradictory
The terms "concurrent" and "consecutive" are not defined in the relevant
statute by the legislature. See Utah Code §76-3-401. Merriam-Webster online
defines the word consecutive as "following one after the other in order;
successive".s This definition gains meaning when compared to the dictionary
definition of the word concurrent, which is "operating or occurring at the same
time" and "running parallel". 6 Another helpful comparison is found in Black's Law
which defines consecutive sentences as:

s See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consecutive (last accessed
October 21, 2017).
6
See https://WV\rw.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concurrent (last accessed
October 21, 2017).
10
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"[t]wo or more sentences of jail time in sequence. For example, if a
convicted criminal receives consecutive sentences of 20 years and 5
years, the total amount of jail time is 25 years. -- Also termed
cumulative sentences; back-to-back sentences; accumulative
sentences."
Consecutive sentences, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Black's Law defines
concurrent sentences as:
"[t]wo or more sentences of jail time to be served simultaneously. For
example, if a convicted criminal receives concurrent sentences of 5
years and 15 years, the total amount of jail time is 15 years."
Concurrent sentences, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The Utah Code does provide some information about how concurrent
sentences are to be treated. For example, Utah Code §76-3-401(9) provides that
" [w]hen a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with

the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served." This statute
could be more clear about when a concurrent sentence begins running, but perhaps
that question is so obvious, it needs not be explicitly described by the legislature.
Mulliner asserts that if a sentence is ordered to run concurrently with a sentence
that is already being served, the new sentence begins running the moment it is
issued. This idea is supported in many cases from around the country.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that"[w]hen two sentences
run concurrently, it merely means that, for each day in custody while serving both
sentences, the inmate receives credit toward each sentence." Bullard v.

11
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Department of Corrections, 949 P.2d 999, 1002 (Col. 1997).1This idea is expanded
upon by the Ohio Court of Appeals; "where a sentence is imposed concurrently
with a sentence that has already been imposed, and which the defendant has
already begun serving, the defendant is given the comparative luxury of serving
each day of his second sentence, beginning with the first day, concurrently with a
day served on the first sentence. Thus, if the new sentence is imposed and put into
execution on the 100th day of the old sentence, the defendant is allowed to serve
the first day of his new sentence while, at the same time, serving the 100th day of
the old sentence." Ohio v. Ways, 2013-Ohio-293, ,I10 (Ohio App. 2013). 8
In contrast, "[w]here a sentence is imposed consecutively to a sentence that
has already been imposed, and which the defendant has already begun serving, the
defendant must complete the first sentence before he can begin serving day one of
the second sentence." Ways, 2013-Ohio-293, ,I10.
Several principles important to this case emerge from these definitions and
cases. First is the principle that consecutive sentences must be performed in
orderly succession and in sequence. There can be no break between consecutive
sentences, they run back-to-back where the first sentence ends at the end of its last

See also Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. 1989) ("A concurrent
sentence is one which runs simultaneously, in whole or in part, with another
sentence... The fact that sentences run concurrently merely means that the
prisoner is given the privilege of serving each day a portion of each sentence.")
(emphasis added); People v. Taylor, 7 P.3d 1030, 1-32 (Colo. App. 2000); FlemingPancione v. Menard, 2017 vr 59, ,I,I16-17.
8 See also Washington v. Arizona, 456 P.2d 415, 417 (Ariz. App. 1969) (concurrent
sentences run simultaneously, the second sentence begins the day it is issued).

7
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day and the second sentence begins at the start of the next day. When the first
@

sentence in a consecutive pair ends, the next imm~.Oiqtely begif!~d?.th~rwise, they
are not consecutive.
The second principle is that when sentences run concurrently, every day
served counts as credit against each of the sentences. So, if a person is serving 5
years on one sentence and concurrently serving 15 years on a second, he gets credit
against the 5 year sentence for each day during the first five years, and then that 5
year sentence is finished and the 15 year sentence continues on its own. After both
sentences have been issued, every single day counts against each concurrent term.
And although one sentence may end before the other, both sentences are active
from the beginning.
These principles demonstrate why Judge Law's sentence is problematic, why
it is ambiguous or internally contradictory; these principles demonstrate why it is

~

illegal. The first portion of Judge Law's order is that Count 1 was ordered to run
concurrent to the St. George case. R.230. According to the definition of concurrent
sentences and the cases interpreting that term, Count 1 began to run on March 17,
2004 (the day it was imposed), for

a maximum of 5 years, along with the St. George

case, which had already begun on July 2,
1 was

2003.

In practical terms, because Count

issued on March 17, 2004 and it was for not more than 5 years, the sentence

in Count

1

ended, at the latest, on March

continued on until, at the latest, July

16, 2009,

1, 2018.

while the St. George case

See Table

1

below for a visual

representation of the relationship between Count 1 and the St. George case.

13
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•
Table 1.
July 2, 2003

July 1, 2018

l

l
•

I

St ~rge case (1-15 ~ )

'I

Count 1 (0-5 years)

i

March 17, 2004

i

March 16, 2009

According to the second portion of Judge Law's order, Count 1 and Count 2
were ordered to run consecutively.

R.230.

•

And according to the definition of

consecutive sentences, Count 2 began to run immediately after Count 1 ended. As
mentioned above, Count 1 ended, at the latest, on March 16,

2009.

Therefore, in

order to be consecutive with Count 1, to run back-to-back, Count 2 began, at the
latest, on March 17, 2009 and ran no more than 5 years. Because Count 2 is ordered
to run consecutive to Count

1,

the latest Count 2 could end was March

16, 2014.

See Table 2 below for a visual representation of the relationship between Count 1
and Count 2.
Table 2.

July 2, 2003

July 1, 2018

l

l

March

i

l
17, 2004

March 16, 2009

i
March 16, 2014

14
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•
•

Here's wh.er~ the problem be_gin~. J uqg~.. LPW.. c;i.lso.ordered Gq_upt .7 a.nc;l the
St. George case to run consecutively.

•

consecutive sentences, Count

2

R .230.

Again, according to the definition of

cannot begin to run until immediately after St.

George sentence ends. If the St. George sentence runs the entire 15 years, it is set
to end July

1, 2018.

sentence, Count

2

In order for Count

to be consecutive to the St. George

2

will not begin until immediately after the St. George sentence

ends, or at the latest, on July 2, 2018. See Table 3 below for a visual representation
of the relationship between Count

2

and the St. George case, combined with the

relationships between the other counts.
Table 3.

•

July 1, 2018

July 2, 2003

1.,. .

l

.

i

i
March 16, 11009

·~

'

·0>unt a(o-smrsJ~

St George case (1-15 :,ears)

M.arch 17, 2004

July 11 2023

•

. · -·

. .,i

l

i
March 16, 2014

But as Table 3 makes clear, Count

2

is running twice, and this is illegal.

Count 2 cannot have begun on March 17, 2009 and ended on March 16,
to be resurrected and begin again on July

2, 2018.

2014

only

And yet, according to Judge

Low's order, it is required to do so. According to Judge Low's order, Count 2 must
be consecutive to Count 1 while also being consecutive to the St. George sentence,

15
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all the while, Count 1 and the St. George sentence ran concurrently, with Count 1
beginning on March

17, 2004.

Thus, Judge Low's sentence is either ambiguous,

meaning that it is subject to multiple interpretations because either Count 2 begins
on March

17, 2009

or it begins on July

2, 2018,

or it is internally inconsistent

because it orders Count 2 to begin and after it has already ended.
Given Judge Low's order, the Department of Corrections has to decide
whether it will follow the portion of the order that requires Count
immediately after Count

1

order that requires Count

2

to begin

ends, or instead to follow the portion of Judge Law's
2

to begin immediately after the St. George sentence

®

ends. It may come as no surprise that the Board of Pardons had decided honor the
part of Judge Low's sentence requiring Count
ignoring Count 2's relationship with Count

1.

2

to run consecutive to St. George,

This was also true when the prison

applied Judge Laycock's order as well. Even though Judge Laycock's order
explicitly required Count 2 to run concurrently with Count 1, the Board of Pardons
ignored that portion of the order to make sure Count 2 run after St. George. These
examples demonstrate the illegality of the sentence, they demonstrate how these
sentences are either ambiguous as to the time and manner of service, or how the
sentences are internally contradictory.
The State is likely to claim this sentence is no different than a hypothetical
case where the defendant is convicted on 3 counts in one case, and each count is
ordered to run consecutive to each other count. Presumably, such an order creates
no ambiguity or contradiction. In that case the first sentence would run until it

16
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ends, then the second sentence would immediately begin and run until it ends,

might argue that the first sentence and the third sentence are still consecutive to
each other even though they are not back-to-back. The State may suggest that
because that order is not illegal, neither is the sentence in this appeal illegal. But
there is a significant distinction between these two scenarios,

C. This Court should correct the illegal sentence
Rule 22(e) authorizes this Court to correct the illegal sentence, rather than
remanding to the district court for resentencing. After all, this Court is on equal
footing with the current district court with respect to how to issue a legal sentence,
because the original sentencing court has been retired for years. Both the current
district court and this Court would review the same record, the same statutes, and
the same case law. Therefore, for the sake of judicial efficiency this Court should
correct Mulliner's sentence.
The proper way to construe Judge Schofield's sentencing order, which
follows the law, accounts for the meaning of each of terms used and the logical
relationships between, and which does not result in an illegal sentence, is to amend
the sentencing order as follows:
Count 1 and Count 2 will run consecutive to each other, beginning on
March 17, 2004. The sentences in this case will run concurrent with
the sentence in Case 991500379 (St. George case).

17
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As argued to Judge Low below,9 this constructions accounts for all of Judge

Schofield's terms, follows the statute and meanings of the relevant terms, and does
not created an illegal sentence. Therefore, this should be the sentence.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

Because Judge Low's sentence is illegal it must be corrected. In light of the
meaning of the relevant terms, statutes, and case law, as well as Judge Schofield's
initial oral order, the sentence should be corrected as described above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 2017.

Isl Douglas Thompson
Appointed Appellate Counsel
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule 24(f)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The total word count of this brief is
5,049. It was prepared in Microsoft Word.

/sl Douglas Thompson
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I emailed a copy of the foregoing brief and mailed two paper
copies, postage prepaid, to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division,
criminalappeals@agutah.gov, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
on this 24th day of October, 2017

Isl Douglas Thompson
9 See R.259 ("We think Count 1 and Count 2 should be consecutive to each other
and concurrent with the other case. That would give effect to all of the language in
Judge Schofield's initial order and make a, a sentence that is not illegal. I don't
think any other construction of this sentence can do that, can make it, can account
for the language and not make an illegal sentence.").
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Utah Code
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(i)

76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Limitations -- Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court
shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other
sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on
the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from
the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment
stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode
as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)
(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his
initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court
or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present
offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is
considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other
or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining
imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to
limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
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(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive
sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 , the sentence has not been terminated or
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session
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State of Utah
Vs.
Todd D Mulliner
Case # 031404403

Transcript of the above captioned Hearing that took place on 3/17/2004 in the Fourth
Judicial District Court with Judge Haycock presiding is as follows:

Judge:

"Number 20, Todd Mulliner. This matter is before the Court for sentencJ.
I have reviewed the pre-sentencing report for you Todd is there anything
you wish to say?"

Attorney for Mulliner: "We do not find any errors in the report other than they have
his plea as guilty, not no contest.
Judge:

"It was a no contest, ok.

Attorney for Mulliner: "Your Honor, as for the recommendation, they are
I
recommending that he server zero to five. (Inaudible ...) "we recommenb
that he serve concurrent with what he is already serving. Right now in
!
prison he is a tutor, a math and science tutor. He has attended all of the
classes he has been asked to do. And he is also in group therapy. He is
basically doing everything he can do to learn everything he can from the ,
system before he gets out. He has lots of skills. He knows he can be a
productive member of society. He has a college degree. He has the ability
to get a very good job. We request that this run concurrent so that when h
gets out he can get out sooner and that he can start paying the restitution
amount. We do not object to the restitution amount. We don;t object to
anything else in the report."
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Attorney for the State of Utah:
"Your Honor, we would request consecutive
sentences. The Defendant is already in custody on previous matters and in
order to get a consequence for this case we feel like consecutive sentences
would be appropriate. So, that is the only difference we have."

Judge:

1

"Anything you want to say Mr. Mulliner before I impose a sentence
today?"

Mr. Mulliner: "Yes your honor. I appreciate the opportunity. (Inaudible, ..) "with I
number two, having no fiduciary responsibility. I'll tell you what, I
couldn't agree more with that. I don't want any fiduciary responsibility.
(Inaudible ... ) Regarding restitution, as my attorney has properly
represented, not only is it my extreme desire to do so, I have willingness
and capability are sometimes two different things but I will be highly
capable of making restitution in all of my matters. My criminal past is very
sad. If there is anyone in here (Inaudible ... ) I am very sorry about that.
(Inaudible ...) My desire to not make any excuse whatsoever and to take ,
full responsibility. And, ah, I pray the Court will see the wisdom (inaudibl~
... ). Just a quick note, I have a fiance, we have discussed in detail, in fact;
we have a written financial plan in place, a six or seven year type plan,
l
which is the reason why I am so confident in my ability to pay restitution \
because it involves her heavily. She is currently financially stable and self-I
sustaining and for the most part will remain that way. In our family life she.
would be the main provider to the family (Inaudible ... )
I

Anyway, other than my extreme sorrow, and in this particular case, again, aj
the risk of sounding like I'm mitigating, it was actually a sincere effort on
my part, when I went to prison, when I was remanded to prison in July of
last year, it was that specifically which caused these people to have
heartache over what was going on. Though it is was against the law I
understand now but at the time my intention was sincere, it wasn't a
complaint or problem until I disappeared that the issue surfaced (Inaudible

....)
Judge:

"In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree
felonies it will be the order of the Court that this defendant server an
indeterminate term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison, an !
an order additionally you pay restitution in the sum of $2975, that you not
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hold any positions of fiduciary responsibility. ·I am going to order that
Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and
that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will have one concurrent and one
consecutive sentence so that there is some modicum of separate
accountability. (Inaudible ... ) Board of Pardons will figure out what to d~
with that (Inaudible ... )
1

Mr Mulliner:

"Thank you your Honor"
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Addendum C - R.030-31 March 17, 2004 Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

(it

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES

Plaintiff,

SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

~

vs.

Case No: 031404403 FS

TODD MULLINER,

Judge:

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD

Date:

March 17, 2004

Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk:

jennyc

Prosecutor: KELLY, DONNA M
Defendant Present
Defendant's Attorney(s): JARVIS, GUNDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 15, 1964
Video
Tape Number:

11

Tape Count: 10:18

CHARGES
1. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest
~

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

HEARING

{j

This matter comes before the court for sentencing.
custody from the prison.

The defendant is present in

Counsel addresses as to the recommendation.

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree

~

Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
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Case No: 031404403 Date:

Mar 17, 2004

Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the UTAH County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your custody for

transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

The sentence for count 1 is to run consecutive to the time the defendant is now
serving.

Count 2 is to run concurrent with the time the defendant is now serving.

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE

The defendant is not to have any fiduciary responsibility.

SENTENCE TRUST

The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:

Amount: $2975.00 Plus Interest

Pay in behalf of: VICTIM C/O STATE OF UTAH
The amount of Restitution

Date:
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD
District Court Judge
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Addendum D - R.078-80 February 3, 2016 Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

MINUTES

STATE OF UTAH,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: 031404403 FS

TODD MULLINER,

Judge:

CLAUDIA LAYCOCK

Date:

February 3, 2016

~

Defendant.

PRESENT

Clerk:

~

joyc

Prosecutor: RAGAN, SHERRY E

Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION

Date of birth: June 15, 1964
Audio

Tape Number:

16-201

Tape Count: 10:24

CHARGES
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

1. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

HEARING

(,j

This matter comes before the Court for Oral Argument re: defendant's motion to correct
illegal sentence.

The defendant appears prose.

The Court summarizes the matter.
~

Mr. Mulliner addresses the Court stating argument in support of motion.
10:37 Ms. Ragan states argument in opposition of an illegal sentence.
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Case No: 031404403 Date:

Feb 03, 2016

10:45 Mr. Mulliner with closing.
10:47 The Court accepts the transcript prepared by the defendant's brother.
finds the there was a clerical error.

The Court

The Court, under Rule 30(b), corrects the clerical error. The Court also grants the
Rule 22(e) motion and corrects the original sentence/commitment.
Court orders the defendant serve no more than five years on each third degree felony,
concurrently with each other.
Count 1 will run concurrently with the St. George matter, #991500379.
consecutively to case #991500379.

Count 2 will run

The Court orders the same restitution as before, $2975.00, payable to the victim. The
Court orders the defendant not to obtain any employment where he would have any
fiduciary responsibilities.
The defendant is remanded back to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

end time: 10:57
SENTENCE PRISON
GJ)

Gj

Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 031404403 Date:

Feb 03, 2016

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

Count 1 to run concurrently with case #991500379.

Count 2 to run consecutively to

991500379.

Restitution

Amount: $2975.00 Plus Interest

Pay in behalf of: C/O STATE OF UTAH VICTIM

CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State
Prison - Draper.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

Case No: 031404403 Date:

Feb 03, 2016
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Addendum E - R.220-30 June 27, 2017 Ruling and Order
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FILED
JUN 2 7 2017
4TH DISTRiCT
STATE Of UTAH

UTAH COUftJTY

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING and ORDER on
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
CORRECT AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
V.

TODD MULLINER,
Case No. 031404403
Judge Low

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATIER comes before the court on Defendant's
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Oral arguments were held on June 7, 2017, at 8:00'
a.m., Adam Pomeroy representing Plaintiff and Douglas Thompson representing
Defendant.

RULING
On March 17, 2004, the court, Judge Anthony Schofield presiding, sentenced
Defendant. Defendant had previously been sentenced to prison for 1 to 15 years on a
second degree felony in case number 991500379. In sentencing Defendant on the present
case, Judge Schofield said,
In the matter number 20 on the calendar on each of the third degree felonie~
it will be the order of the Court that this defendant serve an indeterminate f
Page 1 of 11
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term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison .... I am going to
order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are ,
serving and that Count 2 run consecutive so that you will have one
concurrent and one consecutive sentence so that there is some modicum of
separate accountability.
The court then indicated that the "Board of Pardons will figure out what to do with that.'~

I
I

The written order prepared after the hearing switched the counts so that count one, inste~d
I
I

of count two, ran consecutively.
On October 23, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to correct the March 17, 2004,
!

sentence. Defendant argued that the court failed to address whether the counts in this casf
should run consecutively or concurrently with each other as required by Utah Code§ 76-:
3-40l(l)(a). On February 3, 2016, the court, Judge Claudia Laycock presiding, granted
,
@

the motion by correcting the clerical error regarding which count was to run consecutivejy
I

with the previous case and also by ordering the two counts in this case to run concurrent~
i

with each other.
On April 12, 2017, Defendant filed another motion, this time to correct the 2016
sentence. He argues that the 2016 sentence is still illegal because it orders that the two
counts in this case run concurrently with each other but only orders one of them to run

;

consecutively with Defendant's previous sentence. This, Defendant notes, is impossible ..
When a district court imposes an illegal sentence, it retains jurisdiction until a
Page 2 of 11
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valid sentence is imposed. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at 1 17. 1 The corrected sentence may be
~

more severe than the previously imposed illegal sentence. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856,
860 (Utah 1995). This is because, "[a]s a rule, illegal sentences are void and neither
create rights nor impair or affect any rights." Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at ,r 17. However, "there
I
may be circumstances under which even a corrected illegal sentence may be
fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due process." Id. at ,r 14 (internal quotation
marks omitted). "Thus, when a district court corrects an illegal sentence, it must avoid
any actions that may have a real, rather than very speculative, chilling effect on the
constitutional right to appeal." Id (internal quotation marks omitted). "Nor may
vindictiveness play a part in a new sentence that a defendant receives after successfully
challenging an illegal sentence." Id.
I

In 2009, our supreme court cited, with approval, the Tenth Circuit's definition of:

Rule 22(e), prior to May I, 2017, stated, "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or ~
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." It was modified on May 1, 2017, to
~
incorporate case law differentiating between "manifestly" illegal sentences that can be correcte
at any time, and ordinary "run of the mill" errors in sentencing that can be reviewed only on
appeal. This distinction evolved in order to curb abuses and prevent endless litigation of
sentences. See e.g., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 115, 84 P.3d 854 ("While rule 22(e)
allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any time, it must be narrowly circumscribed to
prevent abuse" and should only be applied to "patently" illegal sentences, not "ordinary or 'run-.
of-the-mill' errors that should only be reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.").
1

1

I'

1

Page 3 of 11
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an illegal sentence: "An illegal sentence is one which is ambiguous with respect to the
time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is asentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT
14,113,203 P.3d 984. The next year, it confirmed that Yazzie's definition was a good
one. State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32,, 12,232 P.3d 1008. And finally, it incorporated

Yazzie's language into the current version of rule 22(e).
I

Defendant argues that both the 2004 sentence and the 2016 attempt at correcting ~t
@

are illegal because they are ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which thef
are to be served and because they are internally contradictory. The state concedes that the
2016 sentence is internally contradictory. The court agrees: the two counts are now
explicitly ordered to run concurrently with each other, but only one of them is to run
;

consecutively to Defendant's previous sentence, making it impossible for them to actual~
run concurrently with each other.
In Yazzie, the trial court originally failed to indicate whether the defendant's
sentence would run concurrently with or consecutively to another case for which he had
already been sentenced. Later, after the defendant violated probation, the court corrected
~

the omission by ordering that his sentence run consecutively. This was held neither to
Page 4 of 11
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chill the defendant's rights to appeal nor to be vindictive, and it was upheld by the
~

supreme court even though the district court-by the time it corrected the
sentence-possessed, and likely considered, the defendant's behaviors committed after
his original sentence. See id., ,r 23 (concurring opinion of Chief Justice Durham).
Like in Yazzie, Defendant's 2004 sentence failed to explicitly address whether the
two sentences in the present case would run concurrently with or consecutively to each
other. Defendant asked the court to correct that and it did, in 2016, by ordering them to
run concurrently with each other. But by correcting one error, the court created another:
the two counts cannot run concurrently with each other as long as only one of them runs
consecutively to his previous sentence. Defendant, therefore, now asks the court to undo
the 2016 correction and correct the 2004 sentence in a manner that would run the two
counts in this case consecutively to each other and concurrently with his previous
sentence. This would reduce his total maximum sentence, for both cases, by five years.
The state, on the other hand, asks the court to keep the 2016 correction and remove its
internal contradiction by ordering that both counts in this case run consecutively to
Defendant's previous sentence. This would leave Defendant's maximum sentence at its
current 20 years.
The court will do neither and simply restore Defendant's original sentence.
Page 5 of 11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0224

Defendant argues that the 2004 sentence was ambiguous and asks the court to adopt the
interpretation that would reduce his sentence. Judge Schofield stated, "I am going to order
that Count I of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and that Count
2 run consecutive." Defendant avers that this statement is not clear as to what count 2 was
to run consecutively to: it could mean that count 2 was to run consecutively to count I or
that it was to run consecutively to the sentence he received in case number 991500379. So
he asks for the benefit of the doubt and requests that the court now order that count 2 run
consecutively to count 1 and not to his sentence in case number 991500379. Again,
~

reading this statement in this fashion would reduce his maximum sentence by 5 years
because the sentences in this case would be completely subsumed within the one to 15
year sentence he received in case number 991500379.
The 2004 sentence is not ambiguous. It was clearly the court's intention to requir~
i
one of the counts in this case to run consecutively to Defendant's previous sentence. Th~
I

I

I

statement, "I am going to order that Count l of the matter run concurrent to the other tijb
you are serving and that Count 2 run consecutive" is a grammatical parallelism. Such

l

grammatical structures are used to avoid the unnecessary repetition of words without
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sacrificing meaning. 2 In other words, it is clear that Judge Schofield meant, "I am going
ij)

to order that Count 1 of the matter run concurrent to the other time you are serving and
that Count 2 run consecutive [to the other time you are serving]." The proper
interpretation of the court's statement was previously conceded by Defendant in a
memorandum he filed with the court, pro se, on October 23, 2015. Citing to the 2004
sentence, he stated, "To run Count I concurrent to the other time Mr. Mulliner was
already serving and then Count 2 consecutive to the other time Mr. Mulliner was already
serving results in Counts 1 and 2, the only offenses before this court, to run
i

I

disparately-neither concurrent nor consecutive." Memorandum in Support ofRule 22(e)

I

Motion at 2 (emphasis added). Thus Defendant recognized the plain meaning of the
court's parallel grammatical phrasing and accurately re-stated what count 2 was supposed
to run consecutively to while simultaneously complaining that the court did not specify
whether counts 1 and 2 would run concurrently or consecutively as to each other.
Therefore, the 2004 sentence was not ambiguous about the sentence that count 2 was to ·

2

Parallel grammatical structure means "using the same pattern of words to show that tw(j)
or more words or ideas are of equal importance and to help the reader comprehend what is being
written." Http://examples.yourdictionazy.com/parallel-structure-examples.html (last visited on
6/9/2017). For example, if one were to say, "Alice ran up the hill, and Brian didn't," the obvious
meaning is that Brian did not run up the hill, not that he didn't like raspberries. The parallel
J
construction lets any reasonably attuned listener know that Brian and Alice are being evaluated
relation to the same activity.

f
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run consecutively to. It was to run consecutively to "the other time [Defendant was]
serving"; namely, case number 9915003 79.
Other than supplying alternative interpretations of Judge Schofield's original
sentence, Defendant offers no other basis for correcting his sentence to achieve any other
purpose. He offers no evidence of anything he has done since his original sentence was
imposed, and at oral arguments he objected to the court's inquiry into the underlying facts
of either this case or the case for which he was previously sentenced. Therefore, the court
has insufficient information to evaluate his motion on any basis other than effectuating
Judge Schofield's original intent.
Defendant's 2004 sentence, imposed by Judge Schofield, ordered count 1 to run
~

concurrently with his previous sentence and count 2 to run consecutively to his previous
sentence. The only correction it needed, if anything, was an indication as to whether the
two counts in this case were to run concurrently or consecutively as to each other. Utah

i

Code§ 76-3-40l(l)(a) ("The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the ordet
I

of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or
consecutively to each other"). While the 2004 sentence was admittedly silent on this
question, the answer inexorably follows from what was said: count 2 had to run
(@

consecutively to count 1. There is simply no other way for count 1 to run concurrently
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with Defendant's previous sentence and for count 2 to run consecutively to it. Therefore,

if the 2004 sentence ever did require correction, the court could have, and should have,
merely inserted the omitted-but implied-tenn that count 2 was to run consecutively to
count 1. By ordering counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently with each other, the 2016
sentence created a full-fledged internal contradiction and a legal impossibility not present
in the 2004 sentence. Therefore, the court will vacate it.
While the 2004 sentence is unusual, it is not prohibited. Utah Code section 76-3401(1) requires the court to state on the record whether sentences are to run concurrentl~
or consecutively as to each other and whether the sentences before the court are to run

:

concurrently or consecutively as to any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
The statute does not require different counts to be treated similarly; in other words, one
count can run concurrently with a previous sentence and another can run consecutively tt
that same sentence. Therefore, the 2004 sentence was a lawful sentence. It may have
omitted a term, but that tenn was inescapably implied. The court will restore Defendant'$

I

original sentence and, like in Yazzie, correct it to include the omitted term.
While it would be difficult to argue that this is a vindictive result, or that it may
chill Defendant's right to appeal, the court will nevertheless address these potential
~

concerns. It is neither vindictive nor chilling. First, it faithfully gives effect to Judge
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Schofield's original intent to add five years, and no more than five years, to Defendant's
(j

maximum tenn. Second, Defendant conceded at oral arguments that both resolutions-the
one he suggests and the one the court adopts today-result in the same recommended
release date under the matrix adopted by the Sentencing Commission. Third, Defendant !
concedes that the parole board has already interpreted the 2004 and 2016 sentences to add
five years to his maximum tenn. And fourth, while Defendant is entitled to a corrected
sentence, he is not entitled to a reduced one.
In light of the foregoing, the court will order Defendant's sentence to be corrected,
once again, to undo the 2016 correction and to explicitly order what was already implied
in the 2004 sentence; namely, that count 2 run consecutively to count 1. While it has
taken 13 years and two motions, Defendant's sentence is now unambiguous with respect
to the time and manner in which it is to be served; it is internally consistent; it includes aJI

i

the tenns required to be imposed by statute; it is certain; and it is a sentence that is
authorized by the judgment of conviction. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14 at ,I 13. In short, it is a
lawful sentence.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the court enters the following order:
I

1.

Defendant's sentence is corrected to require that he serve zero to five year~
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in the Utah State Prison on each of the two third-degree felonies in this
case, that count 2 run consecutively to count 1, that count 1 run
concurrently with Defendant's sentence in case number 991500379, and
that count 2 run consecutively to Defendant's sentence in case number
991500379.
2.

This is the order of the court. No additional order is necessary. Defendant ils
I

JUDGE LOW
[MAILING CERTIFICATE ON FOLLOWING PAGE]

Page 11 of 11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0230

Addendum F - R.217-18 June 27, 2017 Sentence, Judgment, Commitment order
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: June 27, 20)7
At the
I0: 13:31 AM
/s/ Thom'}j· ;" ~. ,..;::~, l\
Distriqt <fr.-. ·:",; ·i -1i
\~.~ \~
t - ;.:· l
by
' ~
i:.::·_\;:.1,... ,; :-:•
/s/ ROSE
District Court Cierk

1~i,[Ud:.!t:::.,

~ti~~··'\

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES

Plaintiff,

2ND CORRECTED SENTENCE, JUDGMENT,
COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031404403 FS

TODD MULLINER,
Defendant.

Clerk:

Judge:

THOMAS LOW

Date:

June 26, 2017

resew

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 15, 1964
Audio

CHARGES
2. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

1. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: No Contest

- Disposition: 02/04/2004 No Contest

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison time on count two is to run consecutively to count one. The prison time on
count one is to run concurrently with the prison time on case number 991500379. The
prison time on count two is to run consecutive to the prison time on case 991500379.
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@

Case No: 031404403 Date:

Jun 26, 2017

@

The sentence is corrected based on the Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

@

@

@
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